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ABSTRACT 
 Human information processing theories of workplace safety suggest that cognition is 
an antecedent of safety behavior. However, little research has directly tested cognitive 
variables as predictors of workplace safety within the industrial/organizational psychology 
research domain. Counterfactual thinking is defined as cognitions about what might have 
been. Social psychologists propose that counterfactual thinking can be functional as it alters 
future behavior in a manner that is consistent with better outcomes. The purpose of the 
current study was to examine the influence of counterfactual thinking on safety behavior 
and mediators and moderators of that relationship. Safety knowledge and motivation are 
hypothesized to be two explanatory mechanisms for this relationship, and safety locus of 
control is proposed to enhance this relationship. A sample of 240 medical providers from a 
hospital in Guizhou Province of China responded to three surveys over a four-month time 
frame. Results showed that overall and upward counterfactual thinking (reflecting on how 
past events could have been better) were positively related to safety compliance and 
participation, which were mediated by safety knowledge but not by safety motivation. 
Furthermore, upward counterfactuals were found to be more strongly related to safety 
compliance and participation and safety knowledge than downward counterfactuals 
(reflecting on how past events could have been worse). Contrary to expectations, these 
relationships were not dependent on safety locus of control. In sum, the findings 
demonstrated that counterfactual thinking is positively associated with safety behavior and 
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safety knowledge, expanding the variables related to workplace safety and laying some 
initial groundwork for new safety interventions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Workplace safety is critical to organizations, as incidents can result in property 
damage, worker injuries, or both, which in turn can lead to significant employee suffering 
and substantial financial costs to the organization. Workplace accidents result in millions of 
nonfatal injuries and illnesses, thousands of fatalities, and billions of dollars in costs 
(Liberty Mutual Research Institute for Safety, 2016; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2015). 
For example, a 2015 economic report indicated nearly 66,000 workplace deaths in China 
(National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China, 2016). Therefore, it is 
critical for researchers to identify antecedents of workplace accidents and injuries, so that 
organizations can direct their efforts toward improving workplace safety and maintaining 
employees’ physical well-being. 
Workplace safety is a multi-disciplinary topic of interest to researchers. As a result, 
numerous theoretical models of workplace safety have been proposed and empirically 
tested within these various domains including Industrial/Organizational (I/O) psychology 
(e.g., Christian, Bradley, Wallace, & Burke, 2009; Neal & Griffin, 2004), human factors 
psychology (e.g., Kobes, Helsloot, de Vries, & Post, 2010; Proctor & Vu, 2010), and 
cognitive psychology (e.g., Ranney, 1994). Each discipline approaches workplace safety 
from a different level of analysis or perspective. I/O psychologists tend to study individuals, 
workgroups, and organizations. Therefore, models of workplace safety tend to be at the 
individual or group level of analysis. Human factors tend to study workplace safety from an 
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event-oriented perspective, modeling all the antecedents that contribute to a specific (often 
unsafe) event, like an incident. Cognitive psychologists are likely to take a much more 
micro-oriented perspective and analyze workplace safety at the task-level of analysis. 
As a result, there is relatively little overlap in the theoretical models of workplace 
safety across disciplines making the prediction of workplace safety based on only one of 
these theoretical models arguably incomplete. For example, whereas cognition has been 
included in human factors models of workplace safety (Proctor & Vu, 2010), cognitive 
processes have not traditionally been included in workplace safety models in the I/O 
psychology literature. 
The focus of this study is on the influence of a specific type of cognition, 
counterfactual thinking, on workplace safety, relative to other known predictors of 
workplace safety in the I/O psychology literature. Counterfactuals are thoughts of what 
might have been toward past negative events, actions, or states (Roese, 1997). According to 
the functional theory of counterfactual thinking, counterfactual thoughts are activated by 
past negative events which can evoke a change in behavior to make progress and 
improvements in the future (Epstude & Roese, 2008). It is proposed that employees who 
experience safety-related events in the workplace have the opportunity to reflect on those 
events. For example, employees might personally experience a minor injury. Subsequent 
counterfactual thinking could facilitate learning from that experience and lead to new 
behavioral strategies which in turn result in less workplace injuries. 
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This study is a relatively novel attempt to examine the extent to which 
counterfactual thinking can have meaningful and important applied implications for 
workplace safety. Beyond examining the direct relationship between counterfactual 
thinking and safety behavior, safety knowledge and safety motivation are proposed to be 
two underlying mechanisms explaining why counterfactual thinking is expected to relate to 
safety behavior. Additionally, an internal safety locus of control is proposed to enhance the 
counterfactual thinking-safety knowledge/motivation relationships. Correspondingly, there 
are three primary study objectives. The first objective is to determine the extent to which 
counterfactual thinking is positively related to supervisor-reported safety behavior. 
Assuming support for this relationship, the second objective is to test the extent to which 
safety knowledge and safety motivation serve as explanatory mechanisms (i.e., mediators) 
of the relationship between counterfactual thinking and safety behavior. The final objective 
is to examine the extent to which safety locus of control serves as a potential boundary 
condition for the counterfactual thinking-safety behavior relationship. 
Antecedents of Workplace Safety 
I/O psychology safety researchers have proposed various models of workplace 
safety and identified multiple determinants of workplace accidents and injuries. For 
example, Neal and Griffin (2004) offered a framework for conceptualizing safety climate 
and safety behavior in which the work environment (safety climate and organizational 
factors) and individual employee attitudes and individual differences are antecedents of 
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safety knowledge and motivation. These variables are depicted as determinants of safety 
performance which in turn lead to safety outcomes.  
Christian, Bradley, Wallace, and Burke (2009) developed an integrated model of 
workplace safety (see Figure 1) grounded in Neal and Griffin’s (2004) framework for 
conceptualizing safety climate and safety behavior. They differentiate person-related and 
situation-related distal predictors of workplace safety. Distal factors are expected to 
influence the more proximal person-related factors: safety motivation and safety 
knowledge. Moving from right to left within Christian et al.’s (2009) model, the most 
proximal cause of workplace accidents and injuries is safety behavior (Christian et al., 
2009; Neal & Griffin, 2004). Safety behavior refers to actions that individuals engage in to 
promote the health and safety of employees, customers, and the environment (Burke, Sarpy, 
Tesluk, & Smith-Crowe, 2002). Based on the distinction between task and contextual 
performance (Borman & Motowidlo, 1993), researchers differentiate between two types of 
safety behaviors (Griffin & Neal, 2000; Neal, Griffin, & Hart, 2000). Safety compliance 
refers to “generally mandated” safety behaviors to maintain workplace safety, which 
include adhering to standard safety procedures and wearing personal protective equipment 
(Christian et al., 2009; Neal, Griffin, & Hart, 2000). Safety participation refers to the 
“frequently voluntary” safety behaviors, which describe behaviors that contribute to the 
safety environment in organizations, not just an individual’s personal safety. Some 
examples of participation behaviors include voluntarily attending safety meetings and  
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Figure 1. An integrative model of workplace safety (Christian et al., 2009) 
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helping coworkers with safety problems. In this study, both safety compliance and safety 
participation will be measured. 
Cognition and Workplace Safety 
 The focus of this study is on the influence of counterfactual thinking on individual 
employee workplace safety knowledge, motivation, and behavior. Counterfactual thinking 
is an event-based cognitive process which consists of perception and interpretation of 
situations, knowledge structures, and beliefs (Breckler, 1984; Rosenberg & Hovland, 1960). 
Despite the absence of cognition from workplace safety models published in the I/O 
psychology literature, human factors psychologists have long recognized the role that 
cognitions play in workplace safety. In fact, the information processing approach, a 
conceptual framework in which humans are characterized as communication systems 
comprised of various processes to manage information flow underlies an extensive amount 
of human factors research (Proctor & Vu, 2010). Building on the information processing 
approach, the accident sequence model illustrates multiple stages in the occurrence or 
prevention of incidents when individuals are exposed to hazardous situations (Figure 2, 
adapted from Ramsey, 1985). As depicted in the accident sequence model, an individual 
will first perceive the hazard, mentally interpret it, make a decision to avoid it, and then 
attempt to avoid it. Additionally, several cognitive factors (e.g., mental abilities and 
memory abilities) are proposed to influence each stage of the process. As noted in this 
model, experience is expected to influence the cognition (interpretation) of a hazard and the  
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Figure 2. The accident sequence model (adapted from Ramsey, 1985)  
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decision to avoid it. Correspondingly, counterfactual thinking, a series of cognitive 
processes, is expected to influence the interpretation of hazards and decisions to avoid 
them. It seems that past experiences and counterfactual thinking might also influence 
perceptions of hazards in the first place. 
Together, the accident sequence model and empirical studies informing and 
validating this model (e.g., Hayashi, 1985; Khan, Halim, & Iqbal, 2006) demonstrate the 
influence of cognitive processes on safety behavior. Correspondingly, I modified Christen 
et al.’s (2009) model adding cognitive processes as an antecedent of workplace safety and a 
reciprocal loop in which safety outcomes influence distal situation- and person-related 
factors (see dashed lines and box in Figure 3). 
Counterfactual Thinking 
 Counterfactual thoughts are mental representations of alternatives to past occurrences, 
actions, features, and states (Epstude & Roese, 2008; Roese, 1997). They are thoughts 
about “what might have been” to specific situations or events —reflecting on alternative 
outcomes. In everyday life, counterfactuals take the form of ‘‘if-then” conditional 
propositions in which the ‘‘if” specifies an antecedent such as a person, action, or a 
circumstance change and the ‘‘then” specifies a consequent or outcome.  
 The consideration of “what might have been” originated with philosophers such as 
Aristotle and Plato who contemplated the status of subjunctive conditions and nonexistent 
but tangible ideal outcomes in their writings. In the seventeenth century, the German 
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Figure 3. A modified integrative model of workplace safety (adapted from Christian et al., 2009) 
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philosopher, Leibniz, embraced these ideas by arguing that an infinite number of possible 
worlds or alternate realities could possibly exist on condition that they didn’t contradict 
laws of logic (Roese, 1997; Roese, & Olson, 2014). A counterfactual thought typically 
posits an imaginary possible world that has some features different from the real world. 
Unlike philosophical counterparts, sociopsychological approaches to counterfactual 
thinking examine the totality of an individual’s cognitive functioning within a social 
context (Roese, 1997). Although counterfactual thinking is an event-driven cognitive 
process and often assessed relative to a specific event, researchers have also assessed 
engagement in these thought processes more generally or globally in terms of an overall 
tendency to engage in counterfactual thinking (Rye et al., 2008). It can be assessed at the 
individual person-level of analysis in that some people will engage in this cognitive process 
following a specific event more so than others, despite having the same or very similar 
experience. Thus the act of engaging in counterfactual thinking varies across individuals. 
Further, some people will proceed to reflect on this event quite extensively, whereas others 
may only think about the event for a relatively brief period of time. Thus, the extent to 
which individuals engage in counterfactual thinking about a specific event will vary across 
individuals (Kasimatis & Wells, 1995). In a nutshell, across events, there is likely to be 
between-person variability in the extent to which individuals engage in counterfactual 
thinking. 
Over the past several decades, counterfactual thinking has received considerable 
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attention by social psychologists (Roese, 1997). The propensity to wonder about what 
might have been, about alternatives to past events, is a pervasive feature of human thinking 
(Roese, 1994). For example, “if I had studied harder, I would have gotten better grades”, “If 
I had cared more about my partner, I would have not lost my love”. Surprising or negative 
life events tend to increase an individual’s propensity for generating counterfactuals (e.g., 
Epstude & Roese, 2008; Miller, Turnbull, & McFarland, 1990; Roese, 1994). This research 
has extended our understanding of counterfactuals and their influence on various outcomes 
in multiple areas of psychology. Counterfactuals influence an individuals’ reasoning about, 
and meaning ascribed to, past events (McAdams & Albaugh, 2008) and impact a range of 
judgments such as decision-making and blame (Roese, 1997). Counterfactuals also impact a 
range of cognitive and affective reactions including causal ascriptions (Wells & Gavanski, 
1989), persistence (Markman, McMullen, & Elizaga, 2008), regret and disappointment 
(Zeelenberg, van Dijk, Van der Pligt, Manstead, Van Empelen, & Reinderman, 1998), and 
happiness (J. T. Johnson, 1986). 
 Upward versus Downward Counterfactuals. There are a number of different 
characteristics on which counterfactual thinking can be differentiated and organized. 
Perhaps the most studied counterfactual characteristic is the direction of the counterfactual - 
whether the alternative outcome is better or worse than what originally occurred. Upward 
counterfactuals involve better alternatives (e.g., “if I had worn gloves, I would have 
protected myself from the patient’s blood”). Contrarily, downward counterfactuals involve 
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worse alternatives (e.g., “if the patient’s blood splattered on my skin, I would have been 
infected” (Markman, Gavanski, Sherman, & McMullen, 1993; Roese, 1994).  
Upward counterfactuals benefit individuals’ performance by envisioning future 
changes and elevating intentions to perform future success-facilitating behaviors 
(Krishnamurthy & Sivaraman, 2002; Landman, Vandewater, Stewart, & Malley, 1995; 
Roese, 1994). Nasco and Marsh (1999) showed that upward counterfactual thinking 
enhanced individuals’ subjective control and led to better performance. Using an anagram 
paradigm, Markman et al. (2008) examined the relationship between counterfactual 
thinking and persistence. They found that upward counterfactual thinking was associated 
with a higher level of persistence, which enhanced performance in subsequent tasks. 
Several empirical studies have demonstrated that upward counterfactuals have stronger 
effects on performance than downward ones (e.g., Krishnamurthy & Sivaraman, 2002; 
Morris & Moore, 2000; Roese, 1994). Both upward and downward counterfactual thinking 
are measured in the current study. 
 Self versus Other Counterfactuals. Counterfactual researchers also differentiate 
counterfactuals based on self- and other-referents. The self versus other distinction simply 
distinguishes between a focus on the actions of oneself or other people (Roese & Olson, 
1995). For example, “I should have worn gloves to avoid exposure to the patient’s blood” 
versus “The patient should have followed my instructions during a blood test.” The focus of 
this study is on the direction (upward vs. downward), not the referent, of counterfactuals. 
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Functional Theory of Counterfactual Thinking 
Social psychologists propose that counterfactual thinking is a beneficial component 
of behavior regulation that may help to promote performance and facilitate improvement in 
behavior (Epstude & Roese, 2008; Markman & McMullen, 2003; Roese, 1994, 1999). 
According to the functional theory of counterfactual thinking, counterfactuals are activated 
by errors, problems, or other negative experiences, and should induce corresponding 
behaviors that avoid these negative experiences in the future (Epstude & Roese, 2008). 
Counterfactual thoughts are believed to serve a behavior-regulating function by 
eliciting cognitive and affective functions (Roese & Epstude, in press; Roese & Olson, 
1997). The cognitive mechanism involves incorporating the information from the 
counterfactual inference (i.e., the lesson learned or the causal inferences of a particular 
action) into behavioral intentions, which in turn evoke corresponding behaviors to avoid the 
negative situation. Additionally, counterfactual thinking also operates through an affective 
mechanism which increases an individual’s motivation to demonstrate effective behaviors 
(Epstude & Roese, 2008; Roese & Epstude, in press). These two processes are not mutually 
exclusive; in other words, they can occur simultaneously. 
In terms of a cognitive mechanism, counterfactuals influence behaviors through a 
regulatory loop consisting of a negative event (e.g., accident), followed by a counterfactual 
thought and cognitive inference, behavioral intentions to engage in behavior that will 
improve the outcome, followed by the corresponding behavior to avoid similar negative 
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events in the future (Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & Trötschel, 2001; Roese & 
Olson, 1997). This process includes three important contingencies: (1) negative events 
activate counterfactual thinking, (2) counterfactual thinking activates a behavioral intention, 
and (3) the behavioral intention leads to corresponding behavior. This regulatory loop 
maintains homeostasis by increasing behaviors when facing problems and decreasing 
behaviors when problems are solved (Epstude & Roese, 2008). 
With regard to the affective mechanism, counterfactual thinking triggers affective 
reactions (Roese, 1994), which motivate individuals to change their behavior to improve 
performance. Research in social psychology has demonstrated empirical support for 
affective effects of counterfactual thinking (e.g., Markman, McMullen, & Elizaga, 2008; 
McMullen & Markman, 2000). Negative affect triggered by upward counterfactuals (i.e., 
feeling bad because something better could have happened) or downward counterfactuals 
(i.e., feeling bad because something worse could have happened) motivates individuals to 
exert greater effort and striving on a subsequent task (Markman et al., 2008; McMullen & 
Markman, 2000), which should theoretically result in better performance. 
Counterfactual Thinking and Health-related Behavior 
As noted earlier, there are a number of safety-related events in the workplace that 
could trigger counterfactual thoughts about workplace safety. These include actual 
incidents that result in injury or property damage, as well as “near misses” (also called near 
accidents or close calls in which something with significant consequences almost occurred
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These events are expected to activate counterfactual thinking (Dillon & Tinsley, 2008), 
which in turn produce corresponding corrective behaviors that could result in less 
workplace injuries and incidents. For example, a medical provider might think “if I had 
bent my knees when lifting the patient, I would not have injured my back.” 
Although there are numerous studies of counterfactual thinking, relatively few 
studies have examined counterfactual thinking with regard to safe or unsafe behavior. 
Within social psychology, some researchers have begun to examine counterfactual thinking 
with regard to personal health and safety. For example, Epstude and Jonas (2014) 
conducted a study on sexual behavior using a sample of participants who were HIV-
positive. Participants were asked to write down an “if only” thought about their HIV 
infection, perceptions of control related to their infection, and intentions for future safe 
behavior. Two independent raters coded the responses for the inclusion of a counterfactual 
thought. The findings revealed that 39.5% participants reported one or more counterfactuals 
regarding their infection and these individuals had stronger intentions to practice safe sex in 
the future than participants who did not produce counterfactual thoughts. 
Page and Colby (2003) designed a series of four experiments to examine the role of 
counterfactuals on anti-smoking behaviors using a sample of college students. Participants 
were randomly assigned to an upward or downward counterfactual condition and then 
asked to generate corresponding counterfactuals in response to a detrimental smoking 
scenario. Then they were asked to rate their affective reactions toward that scenario as well 
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as their intentions to participate in a smoking-related behavioral test (i.e., a lung-capacity 
test). Page and Colby found that upward counterfactuals had a negative effect on 
individuals’ affective evaluations of the detrimental smoking scenario. However, they 
found no impact of upward counterfactuals on individuals’ willingness to schedule a lung-
capacity test. 
Ramos and colleagues (2016) examined the role of counterfactual thinking as an 
intervention strategy to promote adherence to the proper use of Attention-Deficit 
Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) medications. In their study, college students who read a 
negative scenario (misuse of the medication resulted in a trip to the hospital and poor 
performance on a test) generated more upward counterfactuals and fewer downward 
counterfactuals than those who read a positive scenario (misuse of the medication resulted 
in better performance on a test). Further, participants who generated counterfactual 
thoughts reported more positive attitudes toward ADHD medication than those who did not 
generate counterfactuals. However, unexpectedly, upward counterfactuals were associated 
with more positive attitudes toward ADHD medication than downward counterfactuals. 
One explanation is that under some conditions, upward counterfactuals provide justification 
or excuses for negative behaviors or outcomes, resulting in dysfunctional consequences 
(Petrocelli, Seta, Seta, & Prince, 2012). 
The association of upward counterfactuals with functional outcomes is a relatively 
robust phenomenon in the broad counterfactual literature (Roese, 1994; Schwartz & Bless, 
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1992; Sherif & Hovland, 1961) as it helps individuals to identify preparative behaviors for 
the prevention of negative outcomes in the future. However, the association of upward 
counterfactuals with health-related attitudes and behavior appears to be quite mixed and 
inconclusive to date, warranting additional research. 
Counterfactual Thinking and Workplace Safety Behavior 
Within the I/O psychology literature, there appear to be only three articles 
describing research examining counterfactual thinking with regard to workplace safety. The 
first publication linking counterfactual thinking to workplace safety describes a series of 
two studies conducted by Morris and Moore (2000). They explored the relationship 
between counterfactual thinking and learning by coding narrative reports about near misses 
submitted by experienced pilots to the Aviation Safety Reporting System, a near miss 
database. They coded the statements about counterfactual alternatives to near incidents and 
their intentions to prevent a reoccurrence in the future. Their findings suggested that self-
focused, upward counterfactuals were positively associated with safety-related lessons from 
work experiences, which serve as prescriptions for future behavior. 
Morris, Moore, and Sim (1999) conducted a series of two experimental studies 
exploring the role of counterfactual thinking in the decision-making processes in which 
organizational decision-makers respond to incidents or injuries with remedy plans that 
focused on human error correction or generally focused on environments or systems. They 
asked a sample of management students to generate “if only” statements in response to the 
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incident and then to make decisions on how to remedy the existing problem. Then, they 
tested the generalizability of their findings on a sample of museum goers. The results 
indicated that a substantial portion of participants proposed to use human-focused remedies 
rather than environment-focused remedies after they generated “if only” thoughts about the 
incident. This reflects that “if only” thoughts are associated with more human-focused 
actions and subsequent human-focused remedies at a greater rate than would occur 
otherwise. 
 Baran, Beck, and Antes (2015) presented a study exploring learning from near misses 
by analyzing 247 reports from the National Firefighter Near Misses Reporting System. 
They created a coding scheme to measure narrative details of the near misses, self-report of 
learning from them, and engagement of various types of counterfactual thoughts. The 
results revealed that a higher level of engagement in success-oriented thinking (similar to 
upward counterfactual thinking) led to greater learning from near misses, which helps to 
formulate appropriate corrective actions in the future. In summary, research to date on 
counterfactual thinking and workplace safety-related variables suggests that counterfactual 
thinking is functional as it supports learning from previous experiences, is associated with 
intentions to engage in safe behavior, and shapes remedy decisions in response to the 
safety-related events. Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of counterfactual thinking that 
are predicted to promote workplace safety.  
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Table 1 
Characteristics of Counterfactual Thinking that Promote Workplace Safety Behavior 
CFT 
Characteristic 
Description Example 
Supporting 
Studies 
Findings  
Upward vs. 
Downward 
Comparison 
of an actual 
outcome to a 
better 
(upward) or 
worse 
(downward) 
alternative 
“If I had worn gloves, I would 
have protected myself from the 
patient’s blood” (upward) 
“If the patient’s blood had 
splashed on me, I might have 
been infected by the patient’s 
blood.” (downward) 
Morris & 
Moore, 
2000  
Compared to downward 
counterfactuals, upward 
counterfactuals were associated 
with greater self-report of learning 
from negative outcomes, which may 
help to improve safety performance.  
Additive vs. 
Subtractive 
(Action vs. 
Inaction) 
Addition or 
subtraction of 
an aspect from 
the present 
state 
“I should have worn gloves to 
protect myself from blood.” 
(additive) 
“I should not have talked to 
coworkers while drawing 
blood.” (subtractive) 
Page & 
Colby, 
2003 
Compared to subtractive counterfactuals, 
additive counterfactuals had a positive 
impact on individuals’ willingness to 
schedule a lung-capacity test. 
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Table 1  
Continued 
    
CFT 
Characteristic 
Description Example 
Supporting 
Studies 
Findings 
Self vs. Other Focus is on the 
actions of oneself or 
other people 
“I should have worn gloves to 
avoid exposure to the patient’s 
blood” (self)  
“The patient should have 
followed my instructions during 
a blood test.” (other) 
Morris & 
Moore, 
2000 
Self-focused, upward 
counterfactuals can facilitate 
performance-improving lessons 
from safety outcomes (more so 
than other types of counterfactual 
such as other-focused, upward 
counterfactual). 
Controllable vs. 
Uncontrollable 
The controllability 
of the events 
“If I had worn gloves, I would 
have protected myself from the 
patient’s blood” (controllable) 
“It is beyond my ability to save 
that patient without matched 
bone marrow.” (uncontrollable) 
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 Hypothesis 1: Counterfactual thinking is positively related to (a) safety compliance 
and (b) safety participation.  
Upward versus Downward Counterfactuals and Safety Behavior 
 The strength of the effect that counterfactuals have on safety behaviors may depend 
on whether they are upward or downward. Upward alternatives might be interpreted as 
schemas or scripts for safe future actions (Roese, 1994). Consequently, individuals focusing 
on better outcomes should be motivated to make the workplace safer. Thinking about better 
alternatives could trigger several negative emotions (e.g., regret, disappointment, shame, 
guilt; Mandel, 2003; Miller & Taylor, 1995; Niedenthal, Tangney, Price, & Gavanski, 
1994), prompting individuals to make improvements in safety performance to avoid such 
feelings. Moreover, upward counterfactuals are likely to increase feelings of perceived 
control (Nasco & Marsh, 1999) and self-efficacy (Tal"Or, Boninger, Poran, & Gleicher, 
2004), which are likely to positively influence individuals’ subsequent effort and 
persistence to be safe (Brown, Willis, & Prussia, 2000). 
Hypothesis 2: Upward counterfactual thinking is positively related to (a) safety 
compliance and (b) safety participation. 
Downward counterfactual thinking may be either functional or dysfunctional 
depending on whether it elicits contrast or assimilation effects (e.g., Markman, McMullen, 
& Elizaga, 2008; McMullen & Markman, 2000). Contrast effects occur when the evaluation 
of an existing outcome is displaced in a direction away from the hypothetical alternative 
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outcome (Hovland, Harvey, & Sherif, 1957; Sherif & Hovland, 1961). Through contrast 
effects, an existing outcome may appear better compared to a less desirable alternative or 
worse compared to a more desirable alternative. Assimilation effects occur when the 
evaluation of an existing outcome shifts toward that hypothetical outcome (Hovland et al., 
1957; Sherif & Hovland, 1961). By way of assimilation effects, focusing on an alternative 
outcome may drive individuals to assimilate the emotions or attitudes contained in it.  
Specifically, downward counterfactuals, in which employees reflect on worse 
alternatives, could be functional when individuals focus on those worse alternatives and 
assimilate negative emotions (e.g., sadness, anxiety) contained in those worse outcomes, as 
such negative emotions may prompt individuals to be safer by virtue of not wanting to 
experience those negative emotions (Markman & McMullen, 2003; McMullen, 1997). It is 
possible, however, that downward counterfactual thinking could trigger contrast effects 
resulting in positive affective reactions as the employee could be grateful that the worse 
outcome did not happen and therefore experience relief and happiness that the worse 
alternative did not occur. In fact, Dillon and Tinsley (2008) found that people were more 
likely to interpret near misses as “events that almost happened” and therefore successes 
rather than failures “that could have happened”. Further, they reported that counterfactual 
thinking and subsequent learning does not occur as much as it should following a near miss. 
Instead, the employee might be satisfied with the status quo and be less motivated to change 
behaviors. In this situation, the worse outcome is particularly salient, thus prompting  
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Figure 4. The hypothesized influence of counterfactual thinking on workplace safety
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downward counterfactuals. Therefore, the functionality of downward counterfactual 
thinking on safety behavior may be dependent on the emotions that follow the thoughts. 
Nevertheless, given the extensive empirical support for upward counterfactuals to 
have a stronger effect on behavior than downward counterfactuals (Krishnamurthy & 
Sivaraman, 2002; Morris & Moore, 2000; Roese, 1994), it is expected that upward 
counterfactuals will be more strongly related to safety behavior than downward 
counterfactuals.  
Hypothesis 3: Upward counterfactual thinking is more strongly related to (a) safety 
compliance and (b) safety participation than downward counterfactual thinking.  
Safety Knowledge and Safety Motivation as Counterfactual Pathways 
Integrating Neal and Griffin’s (2004) framework for conceptualizing safety climate 
and safety behavior with the functional theory of counterfactual thinking (Epstude & Roese, 
2008) implies that safety knowledge and motivation are potential mechanisms, explaining 
why counterfactual thinking would lead to safe behavior. A pictorial representation 
combining elements of Neal and Griffin’s (2004) framework with the functional theory of 
counterfactual thinking appears in Figure 4.  
 Safety Knowledge. Safety knowledge is defined as an employee’s understanding of 
safety instructions and safety procedures (Probst & Brubaker, 2001). For example, safety-
related information (e.g., risks, value of protective equipment) from a counterfactual 
inference could alter behavioral intentions (e.g., plans to put on gloves before drawing 
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blood), which in turn are expected to result in corresponding safety behaviors (e.g., always 
wearing gloves when drawing blood). Counterfactual thinking is expected to relate 
positively to safety knowledge as reflecting on alternative realities is likely to promote 
learning. With regard to the direction of counterfactuals, upward counterfactuals are 
especially beneficial for promoting learning (Morris & Moore, 2000). Given the numerous 
positive outcomes associated with upward counterfactuals, they are proposed to result in 
more learning and therefore a higher level of safety knowledge than downward 
counterfactuals. 
Hypothesis 4: Counterfactual thinking is positively related to safety knowledge. 
Hypothesis 5: Upward counterfactual thinking is positively related to safety 
knowledge 
Hypothesis 6: Upward counterfactual thinking is more strongly related to safety 
knowledge than downward counterfactual thinking.  
 Safety knowledge is proposed to be a cognitive pathway by which counterfactuals 
enhance safety behavior. Counterfactual thinking prompts individuals to think about 
alternative behaviors, situational characteristics, and outcomes, expanding the way they 
think about specific events. As a result, employees are likely to come up with alternative 
solutions to safety-related challenges or problems. Consistent with this theorizing, Morris 
and Moore (2000) found that counterfactual thinking, especially upward and self-focused 
counterfactuals, promotes learning in how to behave more safely in the future. In addition, 
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negative affect evoked by a counterfactual judgment about a safety-related event might 
result in greater effort to seek information that is useful to prevent a reoccurrence. Ideally, 
this newly acquired knowledge will lead to safer behavior in the future. Research in social 
psychology has indicated that one kind of negative affect (i.e., regret) following 
counterfactual thinking played a functional role in learning to achieve a better outcome and 
avoid future regret (Coricelli & Rustichini, 2010). Summerville (2011) demonstrated that 
when individuals experienced disappointment with the outcomes compared to better 
alternatives, they were more inclined to seek information and means to minimize this 
discrepancy. 
Hypothesis 7: The relationships between counterfactual thinking and (a) safety 
compliance and (b) safety participation are mediated by safety knowledge. 
Hypothesis 8: The relationships between upward counterfactual thinking and (a) 
safety compliance and (b) safety participation are mediated by safety knowledge. 
Safety Motivation. Safety motivation is an employee’s willingness to exert effort to 
perform a job in a safe manner (Christian et al., 2009; Neal & Griffin, 2006). Glove 
wearing counterfactuals might increase an individual’s motivation to wear other personal 
protective equipment such as gowns, aprons, masks, and goggles to avoid exposure to 
bodily fluids. Counterfactual thinking is expected to positively relate to safety motivation 
and upward counterfactual thinking is especially useful for inducing motivation (Markman 
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et al., 2008). Thus, upward counterfactual thinking is proposed to have a stronger effect 
than downward counterfactual thinking. 
Hypothesis 9: Counterfactual thinking is positively related to safety motivation. 
Hypothesis 10: Upward counterfactual thinking is positively related to safety 
motivation. 
Hypothesis 11: Upward counterfactual thinking is more strongly related to safety 
motivation than downward counterfactual thinking. 
Safety motivation is proposed to mediate the influence of counterfactuals on safety 
behavior by way of inducing affective responses. Negative affect induced by 
counterfactuals are expected to increase motivation to expend greater effort to engage in 
greater cognitive activity directed at self-enhancement, and to seek more ways that could 
have changed the outcome (Roese & Olson, 1995). Moreover, counterfactual thoughts 
about negative events following unsafe behavior are expected to help employees establish a 
reference point, likely related to a safer outcome, to which the present may be compared. 
This goal could induce a desired end state (Förster, Liberman, & Friedman, 2007), which 
serves as a strong motivator to initiate action to achieve the goal. 
Hypothesis 12: The relationships between counterfactual thinking and (a) safety 
compliance and (b) safety participation are mediated by safety motivation. 
Hypothesis 13: The relationships between upward counterfactual thinking and (a) 
safety compliance and (b) safety participation are mediated by safety motivation. 
   
 28 
Hypothesis 14a: The mediating effect of safety knowledge on the relationship 
between counterfactual thinking and safety compliance is stronger than the mediating effect 
of safety motivation on the relationship between counterfactual thinking and safety 
compliance. 
Hypothesis 14b: The mediating effect of safety knowledge on the relationship 
between upward counterfactual thinking and safety compliance is stronger than the 
mediating effect of safety motivation on the relationship between upward counterfactual 
thinking and safety compliance. 
Hypothesis 15a: The mediating effect of safety motivation on the relationship 
between counterfactual thinking and safety participation is stronger than the mediating 
effect of safety knowledge on the relationship between counterfactual thinking and safety 
participation. 
Hypothesis 15b: The mediating effect of safety motivation on the relationship 
between upward counterfactual thinking and safety participation is stronger than the 
mediating effect of safety knowledge on the relationship between upward counterfactual 
thinking and safety participation. 
A Potential Moderator: Safety Locus of Control  
Individual differences may influence how much individuals learn and are motivated 
by counterfactuals. One individual difference variable that may impact this process is locus 
of control. Locus of control is the extent to which individuals feel that the events in their 
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lives are personally controlled versus controlled by external factors such as fate and luck 
(Rotter, 1966). An internal locus of control represents the belief that life events are 
personally controlled, whereas an external locus of control represents the belief that life 
events are dependent on external forces (Rotter, 1966). Related to this, counterfactual 
researchers have noted that the controllability of an event is related to efforts to make 
improvements elicited by counterfactuals (Girotto, Legrenzi, & Rizzo, 1991). In other 
words, individuals who generate controllable counterfactuals (behaviors within their 
control) tend to have stronger intentions to change behavior than those who generate 
uncontrollable counterfactuals (events that are not within their control). 
Safety locus of control, as opposed to generalized locus of control, is the extent to 
which individuals believe that safety-related events could be personally controlled or 
determined by external factors (Jones & Wuebker, 1985; 1993). Although some researchers 
examine locus of control as a unidimensional construct, Joe (1971) and Rotter (1975) 
conceptualize and advocate for measuring locus of control as a multidimensional construct. 
Thus, both internal and external locus of control will be measured in the current study. Both 
locus of control and safety locus of control have been studied extensively in the safety 
literature. For example, Jones and Wuebker (1993) found that employees with an external 
safety locus of control reported more occupational injuries than employees with an internal 
safety locus of control. Christian et al.’s (2009) meta-analysis demonstrated that locus of 
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control was positively associated with safety behavior and negatively associated with safety 
outcomes (e.g., injuries).  
Internal safety locus of control is proposed to moderate the relationship between 
counterfactuals and safety knowledge and motivation, such that individuals with an internal 
locus of control are likely to experience stronger relationships than individuals with an 
external locus of control. As noted earlier, counterfactuals evoked by negative events are 
expected to activate behavioral intentions to improve the outcome (Epstude & Roese, 
2008). An internal safety locus of control is expected to exacerbate this relationship by 
influencing employees’ intentions to learn from counterfactuals and engage in safety 
actions. In contrast, individuals who believe injuries and accidents are caused primarily by 
external factors will regard safety-related knowledge, motivation and behaviors as less 
useful, and thus less likely to put effort into learning about safety practices and changing 
behaviors. Correspondingly, internal safety locus of control is expected to strengthen the 
relationship between counterfactuals and safety knowledge and motivation. The conceptual 
model of the hypothesized relationships is shown in Figure 5. 
Hypothesis 16: Internal safety locus of control moderates the relationships between 
counterfactual thinking and (a) safety knowledge and (b) safety motivation, such that 
individuals with higher internal locus of control are likely to experience stronger 
relationships than individuals with lower internal locus of control. 
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Hypothesis 17: Internal safety locus of control moderates the relationships between 
upward counterfactual thinking and (a) safety knowledge and (b) safety motivation, such 
that individuals with higher internal locus of control are likely to experience stronger 
relationships than individuals with lower internal locus of control. 
Hypothesis 18: External safety locus of control moderates the relationships between 
counterfactual thinking and (a) safety knowledge and (b) safety motivation, such that 
individuals with higher external locus of control are likely to experience weaker 
relationships than individuals with lower external locus of control. 
Hypothesis 19: External safety locus of control moderates the relationships between 
upward counterfactual thinking and (a) safety knowledge and (b) safety motivation, such 
that individuals with higher external locus of control are likely to experience weaker 
relationships than individuals with lower external locus of control. 
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Figure 5. The conceptual model of the hypothesized relationships
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METHOD 
Participants and Procedure 
Healthcare employees (e.g., nurses, doctors, and administrators) and their 
supervisors were recruited from a hospital in Guizhou Province in China to participate in a 
study about workplace safety. Employees were asked to complete three online surveys with 
approximately one-month in between each administration. In the three surveys, 295, 289, 
and 272 employees provided usable responses, resulting in 98.3%, 96.3%, and 90.7% 
response rates. The final sample consisted of 240 participants who responded to all three 
surveys with matched supervisor ratings. A majority (71.3%) of the respondents were male. 
They ranged in age from 22 to 58 years old (M = 33.40, SD = 7.69). On average, 
participants worked in the focal hospital for 8.53 (SD = 8.39) years. A total of 33 
supervisors provided ratings for employees and each supervisor rated on average 7.27 (SD 
= 4.42) employees.!
By using a longitudinal design and gathering data from multiple sources, the 
potential for common method bias was minimized (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & 
Podsakoff, 2003). At Time 1, employees responded to demographic questions (e.g., age and 
gender), background information (e.g., work experience and occupational title), and safety 
locus of control. The Time 2 survey contained measures of upward and downward 
counterfactual thinking. The Time 3 survey assessed safety motivation. Also at Time 3, 
employees were instructed to forward a link to their supervisors to complete a brief 
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assessment about them. Supervisors provided ratings of each employee’s safety knowledge 
and safety behavior including safety compliance and participation. The surveys were 
originally written in English and then translated into Chinese using the back-translation 
procedure recommended by Brislin (1970), which ensures that translated versions preserve 
their original meaning. All surveys were administered online and linked over time and with 
supervisor ratings using employee identification numbers.  
Measures 
 Counterfactual Thinking. Counterfactual thinking was measured using a scale based 
on Rye, Cahoon, Ali, and Daftary’s (2008) counterfactual thinking for negative event scale. 
Counterfactual thinking was assessed using six items: three items for upward 
counterfactuals and three for downward ones. Participants were asked to think about a 
negative safety-related event that occurred in the past month while working in the hospital. 
Example items for upward and downward counterfactuals, respectively, were: “I think 
about how much better things could have been.” and “Although what happened was 
negative, it clearly could have been a lot worse.” Participants rated these items on a five-
point scale (1 = “Never”; 5 = “Very Often”). Internal consistency reliabilities for upward, 
downward, and overall (upward and downward combined) counterfactual thinking were 
.88, .90, and .93, respectively. 
 Safety Locus of Control. Jones and Wuebker’s (1985) safety locus of control scale 
was used to measure safety locus of control. Five of the six original items were utilized to 
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assess internal safety locus of control and nine items were used to assess external safety 
locus of control. One item (i.e., “Most of my accidental injuries are preventable”) was not 
included because it refers to individuals’ own accidents which may confuse participants if 
they have not recently experienced an injury. Example items for internal and external safety 
locus of control, respectively, were: “Industrial accidents are due to employee 
carelessness.” “For me avoiding accidents is a matter of luck.” Participants responded to all 
items on a five-point agreement scale. Internal consistency reliability for internal and 
external safety locus of control was .86 and .70, respectively. 
 Safety Motivation. Safety motivation was measured using six items adapted from 
Neal, Griffin, and Hart’s (2000) measure. Three of the items assessed individuals’ 
motivation to improve patients’ safety and three of the items measured individuals’ 
motivation to improve workgroup safety. An example item reads: “I am driven to improve 
workgroup safety.” Participants rated these items on a five-point agreement scale. Internal 
consistency reliability was .95. 
Safety Knowledge. Safety knowledge was measured using a scale of three items 
adopted from Griffin and Neal (2000) (e.g., “This employee knows how to perform the job 
in a safe manner”). Supervisors responded to these items on a five-point agreement scale. 
Internal consistency reliability was .96. 
 Safety Behavior. Safety behavior was measured using Griffin and Neal’s (2000) two-
dimensional measure. Four items were utilized to assess safety compliance (e.g., “This 
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employee uses all the necessary safety equipment to do the job”) and four items were used 
to assess safety participation (e.g., “This employee promotes the safety program within the 
organization”). Supervisors responded to all items on a five-point agreement scale. Internal 
consistency reliability was .92 and .94 for safety compliance and participation, respectively. 
Data Analysis 
Hypotheses were tested in three steps. First, the main effects of counterfactuals on 
safety knowledge, motivation, and behavior (Hypotheses 1-2, 4-5 and 9-10), as well as the 
potential moderating effect of safety locus of control (Hypotheses 16-19) were tested using 
multiple regression. Second, Steiger’s z test was utilized to examine the differences in 
magnitude between the effects of upward and downward counterfactuals on safety 
knowledge, motivation, and behavior (Hypotheses 3, 6, 11; Hoerger, 2013; Steiger, 1980). 
Third, simple mediation models (Hypotheses 7-8 and 12-15) were tested using a SPSS 
macro developed by Preacher and Hayes (2004) that facilitates an estimation of the 
mediation effect with a bootstrap approach to obtain confidence intervals. Bootstrapping is 
recommended by researchers for mediational analyses, because of its advantage to avoid 
power issues induced by nonnormal sampling distributions of an indirect effect 
(MacKinnon, Lockwood, & Williams, 2004). Consistent with recommendations in the 
literature, the significance of the indirect effects was determined based on the 95% bias-
corrected bootstrap confidence intervals using 5,000 bootstrap samples (Preacher, Rucker, 
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& Hayes, 2007). Also, bootstrapping was used to obtain the standard errors for the path 
coefficients.   
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RESULTS 
Because of the nested nature of the data with one supervisor rating multiple 
employees, supervisor ratings of employee’s safety knowledge, safety compliance, and 
safety participation were not independent. Accordingly, the extent of the dependence was 
assessed using the intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC). ICC represents the percentage of 
variance accounted for by group differences (Hox, 2002). The ICC values for safety 
knowledge, safety compliance, and safety participation were 0, 0, and .65, respectively. 
Notably, the ICCs of the two variables (i.e., safety knowledge and safety compliance) were 
zero and only the ICC for safety participation had a large effect. This fluctuation may be the 
result of a small sample of groups (N = 33), which could inflate group-level variance 
resulting in unreliable estimates of ICC (Kreft, 1996).1 
Descriptive statistics and correlations among the variables are presented in Table 2. 
The correlations indicated that counterfactual thinking was positively related to supervisor-
ratings of safety knowledge (r = .17, p < .001) and safety compliance (r = .17, p < .01), but 
not significantly related to supervisor ratings of safety participation (r = -.01, p > .05) and   
                                                
 
 
 
1 Multilevel analyses revealed similar results to the single-level analyses presented in this 
paper. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations among the Variables 
    M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 Age 33.40 7.69            
2 Sex 1.71 .45 .02           
3 CFT 3.09 .84 -.07 -.15* .93         
4 Upward CFT  3.19 .89 -.05 -.12 .94** .88        
5 Downward CFT 2.99 .88 -.08 -.16* .94** .78** .90       
6 Internal SLOC 3.54 .68 .08 -.02 .08 .07 .09 .86      
7 External SLOC 3.00 .50 .12 -.07 .15* .12* .16* .15* .70     
8 
Safety 
Knowledge 
4.24 .66 -.09 .13* .17** .21** .11 .00 -.15* .96    
9 
Safety 
Motivation 
4.08 .58 -.07 .09 -.01 .00 -.03 .07 .14* -.02 .95   
10 
Safety 
Compliance 
4.03 .57 -.09 .16* .17** .21** .11 -.02 .10 .89** .03 .92  
11 
Safety 
Participation 
3.91 .67 -.07 .13* .09 .15* .02 -.05 .13* .83** .00 .85** .94 
Note. N = 240; Sex: 1 = male, 2 = female; CFT = counterfactual thinking; SLOC = safety locus of control. Internal consistency reliabilities 
are shown on the diagonal. 
* p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed). The results for the effects of overall and upward counterfactual thinking on safety-related variables with sex 
controlled in the regression analyses were similar to those without sex controlled. 
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self-report of safety motivation (r = .09, p > .05). Upward counterfactual thinking was 
positively related to supervisor-ratings of safety knowledge (r = .21, p < .001), safety 
compliance (r = .21, p < .01), and safety participation (r = .15, p < .01), but not 
significantly related to self-report of safety motivation (r = .00, p > .05). The relationships 
between downward counterfactual thinking and safety motivation, knowledge, compliance, 
and participation were not significant (r = -.03, p > .05; r = .11, p > .05; r = .11, p > .05; r 
= .02, p > .05).  
Tests of the Effects of Overall Counterfactual Thinking on Safety-related Outcomes 
Multiple regression was conducted to test the effects of overall counterfactual 
thinking on safety knowledge, motivation, and behavior (Hypotheses 1, 4, and 9), as well as 
the potential moderating effect of safety locus of control (Hypotheses 16 and 18). Tables 3 
and 4 presents the results. Counterfactual thinking was positively related to safety 
knowledge (β = .18, p < .01) and safety compliance (β = .19, p < .01), but was not related to 
safety participation (β = .11, p > .05) and safety motivation (β = -.02, p > .05). Therefore, 
Hypothesis 1 received partial support, Hypotheses 4 was supported, and Hypothesis 9 was 
not supported. 
Next, the extent to which internal and external safety locus of control moderated the 
relationships between counterfactuals and safety knowledge and motivation was tested. 
Specifically, neither internal nor external locus of control interacted significantly with 
counterfactual thinking to predict safety knowledge (β = .03, p > .05; β = -.03, p > .05) and  
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Table 3 
Regression Results for Safety Knowledge and Motivation 
Factor and statistic 
Safety knowledge Safety motivation 
Counterfactual Upward counterfactual Counterfactual Upward counterfactual 
ILOC ELOC ILOC ELOC ILOC ELOC ILOC ELOC 
Age -.07 -.10 -.07 -.08 -.07 -.05 -.07 -.07 
Sex .16* .17** .16* .16* .09 .09 .09 .09 
CFT .18** .17**   -.02 .02   
Upward  CFT (UCFT)   .22** .23**   -.01 .00 
Internal safety LOC 
(ILOC) -.01  -.01  .07 -.15* .07 .01 
External safety LOC 
(ELOC)  .14*  .00    .08 
CFT×ILOC .03    .03    
UCFT×ILOC   .02    .05  
CFT×ELOC  -.03    .02   
UCFT×ELOC    .01    .01 
R2 .06** .09** .09** .08** .02 .03 .02 .02 
F 3.10** 3.98** 3.95** 3.93** .93 1.58 1.02 .87 
df 5, 234 5, 234 5, 234 5, 234 5, 234 5, 234 5, 234 5, 234 
Note. N = 240; CFT = counterfactual thinking; LOC = locus of control. UCFT = upward counterfactual thinking. ILOC = 
Internal safety locus of control. ELOC = external safety locus of control.  
* p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed). 
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Table 4 
Regression Results for Safety Compliance and Participation 
Factor and statistic 
Safety compliance Safety participation 
Counterfactual Upward counterfactual Counterfactual Upward counterfactual 
Step 1 Step 2 Step 1 Step 2 Step 1 Step 2 Step 1 Step 2 
Age -.08 -.01 -.08 -.01 -.06 .00 -.06 .00 
Sex .19** .05 .19** .05 .15* .02 .16* .02 
CFT .19** .03   .11 -.05   
Upward CFT   .23** .02   .16* -.03 
Safety knowledge  .88**  .88**  .83**  .83** 
Safety motivation  .04  .04  .01  .01 
R2 .08** .79** .08** .79** .04* .68** .05** .68** 
F 5.90** 176.57** 7.18** 176.48** 2.83* 101.44** 4.07** 100.72** 
df 3, 236 5, 234 3, 236 5, 234 3, 236 5, 234 3, 236 5, 234 
Note. N = 240; CFT = counterfactual thinking. 
* p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed). 
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Table 5 
Simple Mediation Results  
Predictor Outcome  Mediator 
Indirect 
Effect  
Boot SE LL95%CI UL95%CI 
CFT 
Safety compliance 
Safety knowledge .17 .08 .03 .34 
Safety motivation .00 .00 -.01 .01 
Safety participation 
Safety knowledge .16 .07 .03 .32 
Safety motivation .00 .00 -.01 .00 
Upward CFT 
Safety compliance 
Safety knowledge .20 .08 .06 .37 
Safety motivation .00 .00 .00 .01 
Safety participation 
Safety knowledge .19 .07 .06 .34 
Safety motivation .00 .00 .00 .01 
Note. N = 240; CFT = counterfactual thinking; SE = standard error; LL = lower level; CI = confidence interval; UL = upper 
level. 
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safety motivation (β = .03, p > .05; β = .02, p > .05). Thus, Hypotheses 16 and 18 were not 
supported. 
 Bootstrap analyses were conducted to test the indirect effects of safety knowledge and 
motivation on the relationships between counterfactual thinking and safety compliance and 
participation. The results, presented in Table 5, indicate that safety knowledge had an 
indirect effect on the relationship between counterfactual thinking and safety compliance 
(95% bootstrap CI = .03 to .34) and safety participation (95% bootstrap CI = .03 to .32, 
providing support for Hypothesis 7. However, the results did not support an indirect effect 
of counterfactual thinking on safety behavior through safety motivation (safety compliance, 
95% bootstrap CI = -.01 to .01; safety participation, 95% bootstrap CI = -.01 to .00). Thus, 
Hypothesis 12 was not supported. Also, the mediating effect of safety knowledge on the 
relationship between counterfactual thinking and safety compliance was shown to be 
stronger than the mediating effect of safety motivation on the relationship between 
counterfactual thinking and safety compliance. Therefore, Hypothesis 14a was supported. 
However, the mediating effect of safety motivation on the relationship between 
counterfactual thinking and safety participation was shown to be weaker than the mediating 
effect of safety knowledge on the relationship between counterfactual thinking and safety 
participation, which did not support Hypothesis 15a.  
Tests of the Effects of Upward Counterfactual Thinking on Safety-related Outcomes 
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Similarly, multiple regressions were conducted to test the effects of upward 
counterfactual thinking on safety knowledge, motivation, and behavior (Hypotheses 2, 5, 
and 10), as well as the potential moderating effect of safety locus of control (Hypotheses 17 
and 19). Tables 3 and 4 presents the results. In support of Hypotheses 2 and 5, upward 
counterfactual thinking was positively related to safety knowledge (β = .22, p < .01), safety 
compliance (β = .23, p < .01), and safety participation (β = .16, p < .05). However, upward 
counterfactual thinking was not significantly related to safety motivation (β = -.01, p > .05), 
thus Hypothesis 10 was not supported. 
Next, the extent to which internal and external safety locus of control moderated the 
relationships between upward counterfactuals and safety knowledge and motivation was 
tested. Specifically, neither internal nor external locus of control interacted significantly 
with upward counterfactual thinking to predict safety knowledge (β = .02, p > .05; β = .01, 
p > .05) and safety motivation (β = .05, p > .05; β = .01, p > .05). Thus, Hypotheses 17 and 
19 were not supported.  
Steiger’s z test was used to examine whether upward counterfactual thinking has a 
significantly stronger relationship with safety knowledge, motivation, compliance and 
participation than downward counterfactual thinking (Hoerger, 2013; Steiger, 1980). The 
results indicated that the relationships between upward counterfactual thinking and safety 
compliance as well as participation were stronger than the relationships between downward 
counterfactual thinking and safety compliance as well as participation (z = 2.36, p < .05; z = 
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3.03, p < .05). Therefore, Hypotheses 3a and 3b were supported. In addition, upward 
counterfactual thinking was found to be more strongly related to safety knowledge than 
downward counterfactual thinking (z = 2.36, p < .05), but revealed no difference from 
downward counterfactuals in relation with safety motivation (z = .70, p > .05). Thus, 
Hypothesis 6 was supported and Hypothesis 11 was not supported. Bootstrap analyses were 
conducted to test the indirect effects of safety knowledge and motivation on the 
relationships between upward counterfactual thinking and safety compliance and 
participation. The results, presented in Table 5, showed that safety knowledge had an 
indirect effect on the relationships between upward counterfactuals and safety compliance 
(95% bootstrap CI = .06 to .37) and safety participation (95% bootstrap CI = .06 to .34), 
providing support for Hypothesis 8. However, the results did not support an indirect effect 
of upward counterfactual thinking on safety behavior through safety motivation (safety 
compliance, 95% bootstrap CI = .00 to .01; safety participation, 95% bootstrap CI = .00 
to .01). Thus, Hypothesis 13 was not supported. Also, the mediating effect of safety 
knowledge on the relationship between upward counterfactual thinking and safety 
compliance was shown to be stronger than the mediating effect of safety motivation on the 
relationship between upward counterfactual thinking and safety compliance. Therefore, 
Hypothesis 14b was supported. However, the mediating effect of safety motivation on the 
relationship between upward counterfactual thinking and safety participation was shown to 
be weaker than the mediating effect of safety knowledge on the relationship between 
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upward counterfactual thinking and safety participation, which did not support Hypothesis 
15b. A summary of statistical support for all the hypotheses is presented in Table 6. 
! !
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Table 6 
Statistical Support for Hypotheses 
Hypotheses Statistical Support 
Hypothesis 1: Counterfactual thinking is positively related to (a) safety compliance and (b) safety 
participation. Supported  
Hypothesis 2: Upward counterfactual thinking is positively related to (a) safety compliance and (b) safety 
participation. Supported  
Hypothesis 3: Upward counterfactual thinking is more strongly related to (a) safety compliance and (b) 
safety participation than downward counterfactual thinking.  Supported  
Hypothesis 4: Counterfactual thinking is positively related to safety knowledge. Supported  
Hypothesis 5: Upward counterfactual thinking is positively related to safety knowledge. Supported  
Hypothesis 6: Upward counterfactual thinking is more strongly related to safety knowledge than 
downward counterfactual thinking. Supported  
Hypothesis 7: The relationships between counterfactual thinking and (a) safety compliance and (b) safety 
participation are mediated by safety knowledge. Supported  
Hypothesis 8: The relationships between upward counterfactual thinking and (a) safety compliance and 
(b) safety participation are mediated by safety knowledge. Supported  
Hypothesis 9: Counterfactual thinking is positively related to safety motivation. Not Supported  
Hypothesis 10: Upward counterfactual thinking is positively related to safety motivation. Not Supported  
Hypothesis 11: Upward counterfactual thinking is more strongly related to safety motivation than 
downward counterfactual thinking. Not Supported  
Hypothesis 12: The relationships between counterfactual thinking and (a) safety compliance and (b) 
safety participation are mediated by safety motivation. Not Supported  
Hypothesis 13: The relationships between upward counterfactual thinking and a) safety compliance and 
b) safety participation are mediated by safety motivation.  Not Supported  
Hypothesis 14a: The mediating effect of safety knowledge on the relationship between counterfactual 
thinking and safety compliance is stronger than the mediating effect of safety motivation on the 
relationship between counterfactual thinking and safety compliance. Supported  
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Table 6  
Continued 
 
Hypotheses Statistical Support 
Hypothesis 14b: The mediating effect of safety knowledge on the relationship between upward 
counterfactual thinking and safety compliance is stronger than the mediating effect of safety motivation 
on the relationship between upward counterfactual thinking and safety compliance. Supported  
Hypothesis 15a: The mediating effect of safety motivation on the relationship between counterfactual 
thinking and safety participation is stronger than the mediating effect of safety knowledge on the 
relationship between counterfactual thinking and safety participation. Not Supported  
Hypothesis 15b: The mediating effect of safety motivation on the relationship between upward 
counterfactual thinking and safety participation is stronger than the mediating effect of safety knowledge 
on the relationship between upward counterfactual thinking and safety participation. Not Supported  
Hypothesis 16: Internal safety locus of control moderates the relationships between counterfactual 
thinking and (a) safety knowledge and (b) safety motivation, such that individuals with higher internal 
locus of control are likely to experience stronger relationships than individuals with lower internal locus 
of control. Not Supported  
Hypothesis 17: Internal safety locus of control moderates the relationships between upward 
counterfactual thinking and (a) safety knowledge and (b) safety motivation, such that individuals with 
higher internal locus of control are likely to experience stronger relationships than individuals with lower 
internal locus of control. Not Supported  
Hypothesis 18: External safety locus of control moderates the relationships between counterfactual 
thinking and (a) safety knowledge and (b) safety motivation, such that individuals with higher external 
locus of control are likely to experience weaker relationships than individuals with lower external locus 
of control. Not Supported  
Hypothesis 19: External safety locus of control moderates the relationships between upward counterfactual 
thinking and (a) safety knowledge and (b) safety motivation, such that individuals with higher external 
locus of control are likely to experience weaker relationships than individuals with lower external locus of 
control. 
Not Supported  
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DISCUSSION 
The current study extends the workplace safety literature by examining the role of 
counterfactual thinking on workplace safety behavior. This study addresses three specific 
gaps identified in the literature of workplace safety. First, study results supported the 
functional effects of overall and upward counterfactual thinking on safety compliance and 
safety participation, but indicated no effect of downward counterfactual thinking on safety 
behavior, demonstrating that the magnitude of the effect of counterfactual thinking on 
safety behavior was contingent on whether it is upward or downward. Second, results 
demonstrated that safety knowledge operates as a mediating mechanism between overall 
and upward counterfactual thinking and safety compliance, as well as safety participation. 
However, safety motivation did not mediate the relationship between counterfactual 
thinking and safety behavior. Third, although safety locus of control was predicted to 
amplify the effects of counterfactual thinking on safety knowledge and motivation, results 
did not support this. Thus, the effects of counterfactual thinking on safety knowledge 
appear to be independent of safety locus of control. 
Theoretical Implications  
The results of this study contribute to the counterfactual and workplace safety 
research literatures by extending prior knowledge in several ways. Past workplace safety 
research within I/O psychology does not explicitly take into consideration counterfactual 
thinking, or even broad cognitive processes. The current study is the first known empirical 
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test of the relationship between counterfactual thinking and supervisor-reported safety 
behavior. On the basis of the current results, individuals reflecting on better alternatives 
when encountering negative experiences are more likely to engage in safe behavior in the 
future. This finding begins to reveal the role of one specific cognitive process when 
predicting workplace safety behavior, which is directly related to workplace incidents and 
injuries. According to the accident sequence model proposed by Ramsey (1985), cognitive 
processes influence perception and interpretation of hazards and decisions to avoid them in 
hazardous situations. Consistent with the previous findings from social and I/O psychology 
(e.g., Morris & Moore, 2000; Page & Colby, 2003), the current study demonstrated that 
counterfactual thinking is an important antecedent of safety behavior in the workplace. 
Future research could examine broader cognitive constructs that impact safety behavior. 
 Second, the findings highlight that safety knowledge is one explanatory mechanism 
linking overall and upward counterfactual thinking to safety compliance, as well as safety 
participation. These findings extend our understanding of why counterfactual thinking is 
relevant to workplace safety behavior by demonstrating further support for previously 
identified cognitive mechanisms associated with counterfactual thinking and regulatory 
behavior. These findings are in line with the functional theory of counterfactual thinking 
(Epstude & Roese, 2008; Roese & Olson, 1997). Consistent with the previous cross-
sectional research on safety-related counterfactual thinking on self-reported learning (Baran 
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et al., 2015; Morris & Moore, 2000), upward counterfactual thinking may facilitate safety 
behavior by fostering individuals’ learning about safety practices.  
Third, unexpectedly, safety motivation was not found to be a mediating mechanism 
in explaining how overall and upward counterfactual thinking influence safety behaviors. 
This unanticipated result might be due to the vague time period over which participants 
were instructed to reflect when responding to the safety motivation items. This study 
measured safety motivation following the safety-related event that occurred in the past 
month. However, as safety motivation is theoretically aligned with the counterfactual 
thinking affective pathway, it should be more intense immediately following the negative 
event and likely declines over time. Future research could utilize an experience sampling 
method in which counterfactual thinking and motivation could be assessed immediately 
after a negative event.  
 Finally, safety locus of control was expected to strengthen the effect of counterfactual 
thinking on safety knowledge and motivation. However, this proposition was not supported. 
With a sample size of 240, this study had a power of .33 to detect a f 2 = .01 moderation 
effect and it had power of .58 to detect a f 2 = .02 moderation effect. Based on these 
analyses, it may be premature to eliminate safety locus of control from future investigations 
as a lack of power may have contributed to the failure to detect moderation, as previous 
research has suggested that the perceived controllability of events in counterfactual thinking 
is an important precursor to engagement in learning from counterfactuals (Girotto et al., 
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1991). Another possible reason for the failure to detect moderation is that safety locus of 
control might only facilitate learning from self-focused upward counterfactual thinking, 
however, self- versus other-focused counterfactuals were not differentiated in this study. 
Future research with larger sample sizes differentiating self- and other-focused 
counterfactuals may find evidence for safety locus of control as a moderator of the self-
focused upward counterfactual thinking-safety knowledge/safety motivation relationships.  
Practical Implications 
The results of this study have several practical implications for the improvement of 
workplace safety. First, the results provide evidence and support for the relationship 
between counterfactual thinking and safety behavior, suggesting that counterfactual 
thinking training may be a useful workplace safety intervention (cf. Dillon & Tinsley, 
2008). Such training should highlight the distinction between upward and downward 
counterfactual thinking and the advantages of upward counterfactual thinking. Managers 
could also encourage their employees to think about better alternatives when incidents, 
injuries, or near misses occur in order to learn from them and prevent them from happening 
again. In addition to training and motivating individuals to pursue counterfactual thinking 
(cf., Dillon & Tinsley, 2008), organizations could recruit individuals who are more likely to 
engage in counterfactual thinking and/or continuously learn from their experiences, as well 
as others’ experiences.  
!
 
 54 
Moreover, the finding that safety knowledge plays a central role in explaining the 
effects of counterfactual thinking on safety behavior also suggests that learning from past 
negative experiences is critical to behavioral improvement. Correspondingly, organizations 
could use learning potential as an employee selection criterion and create climates that 
promote learning and personal growth, encouraging individuals to obtain knowledge and 
develop skills and abilities from past negative experiences in order to avoid them in the 
future. Leaders should also make an effort to raise employees’ awareness of the importance 
of learning from these safety-related events.  
Limitations and Future Research Directions 
Despite collecting data from two sources at three different time periods and thereby 
avoiding issues of same-source bias for some relationships examined (Podsakoff, 
MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003), this study has some limitations. An initial concern is 
that specific cognition and affect following the negative events was not directly measured. 
Thus, the nature and intensity of these emotions and how they relate to the variables 
examined remain to be tested in future research, perhaps using more real-time assessment 
or experience sampling methodology. 
A second issue is that this study did not directly measure learning from past safety-
related events and instead assessed safety knowledge as a learning outcome. Learning from 
past events, or experiential learning, is the extent to which individuals draw lessons and 
accumulate knowledge, skills, and abilities through their experiences (Kolb, 2014). In this 
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sense, experiential learning involves cognitive and behavioral engagement in enhancing 
understanding and knowledge and broadening capacities and capabilities through the 
particular event they experienced in the past. However, because information about the 
specific safety-related events was not collected, learning from these events cannot be 
directly measured. Instead, safety knowledge, as the state of overall knowledge level 
following those events, was measured representing a learning outcome that can be 
influenced by learning processes. Moreover, safety knowledge is a narrower term that 
cannot capture skill expansion and ability development via past experiences. Future 
research should choose a direct way to measure experiential learning by gathering 
information about safety-related events and lessons drawn from these events to determine 
whether counterfactual thinking is conducive to effective learning.  
A third concern is that because specific information about the safety-related events 
was not collected, details surrounding the event and differentiating it from other events 
remain unknown. Dillon and Tinsley (2008) noted two definitions of a near miss: as an 
event that almost happens or an event that could have happened and how it is interpreted 
influences counterfactual thinking that follows. They found that events that almost 
happened induce counterfactual thinking and subsequent learning, whereas events that 
could have happened may not induce counterfactual thinking (Kahneman & Varey 1990; 
McMullen, 1997). Near misses can also be differentiated in terms of the severity of the 
potential incident or injury. Future research could take into consideration these near miss 
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characteristics, and explore how different near misses influence the intensity and direction 
of counterfactual thinking. 
Future studies could gather more information about the negative event. This would 
allow for a more nuanced examination of the event (e.g., differentiating near misses from 
injuries, self vs. other, etc.) and how these different types of events relate to the generation 
and types of counterfactuals. Previous research has proposed and found evidence for self-
referent counterfactuals to be more beneficial to learning than other-referent counterfactuals 
(Morris & Moore, 2000; Roese & Olson, 1995). 
Future research could examine other potential mechanisms linking counterfactual 
thinking to safety behavior. For instance, risk perception has been demonstrated to be an 
important antecedent of safety behavior (e.g., Deery, 2000; Rundmo, 1996). Future research 
could examine whether counterfactual thinking influences employees’ perception of risk, 
which in turn is associated with subsequent safety behavior. To better understand the 
mechanisms underlying the relationship between counterfactual thinking and safety-related 
behaviors and outcomes, multiple mediators should be assessed simultaneously. 
To further our understanding of the moderating effects of individuals differences on 
the functional impact of counterfactual thinking, future research should expand the types of 
individual differences assessed. For instance, personality traits (e.g., conscientiousness and 
openness) and self-efficacy might influence how counterfactuals impact safety knowledge, 
motivation, and behavior. Additionally, given that counterfactual thinking is a series of 
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cognitive processes reflecting on events that happened in the past, situational factors such 
as safety climate might influence how individuals benefit from counterfactuals. Therefore, 
future research could conceptualize safety climate as a boundary condition and examine 
how safety climate facilitates safety knowledge, motivation, and behavior. Finally, other 
studies should attempt to replicate the current study findings by collecting data in different 
industries (e.g., construction, oil and gas industry) to determine the generalizability of the 
results. 
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CONCLUSION 
This study is the first empirical study demonstrating the influence of counterfactual 
thinking on safety behavior in workplace. Specifically, overall and upward counterfactual 
thinking were positively associated with safety compliance and participation. With regard 
to the direction of counterfactuals, upward counterfactuals exerted stronger influences on 
safety compliance and participation and safety knowledge than downward counterfactuals. 
Moreover, empirical evidence was revealed for safety knowledge as a cognitive mechanism 
that explains the relationships between overall and upward counterfactual thinking with 
safety behavior. This study provides a foundation from which future research could build to 
advance our understanding of how and why cognitive processes influence workplace safety 
behavior.   
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APPENDIX 
Counterfactual Thinking for Negative Events Scale (adapted from Rye, Cahoon, Ali, 
& Daftary, 2008) 
Safety of employees and patients is critical in a hospital setting. Everyone intends to be 
safe, but unfortunately, incidents and injuries happen sometimes.  
 
Please think of a safety-related event working in the hospital that occurred in the past 
month that had a negative impact on you. An “event” is defined as any type of error, 
mistake, incident, accident, or deviation, regardless of whether or not it results in patient 
harm. Take a few moments to vividly recall that experience and what it was like for you. 
 
Now, think about the types of thoughts you experienced following that undesirable event. 
Using the following scale, rate the frequency with which you experienced the thoughts 
described below. 
Upward Counterfactual Thinking 
1.! I think about how much better things could have been. 
2.! I cannot stop thinking about how I wish things would have turned out. 
3.! Although the bad situation was nobody’s fault, I think about how things could have 
turned out better. 
Downward Counterfactual Thinking 
4.! I think about how much worse things could have been. 
5.! I count my blessings when I think about how much worse things could have been. 
6.! Although what happened was negative, it clearly could have been a lot worse. 
Safety Motivation (revised version based on Neal, Griffin, & Hart, 2000) 
1.! I am driven to improve patient safety. 
!
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2.! I am motivated to maintain patient safety at all times. 
3.! I strive to reduce the risk of patient incidents. 
4.! I am driven to improve workgroup safety. 
5.! I am motivated to maintain workgroup safety at all times. 
6.! I strive to reduce the risk of workgroup incidents. 
Safety Locus of Control (Jones & Wuebker, 1985) 
Internal safety locus of control 
1.! Industrial accidents are due to employee carelessness. 
2.! Most on-the-job accidents and injuries result from employees’ mistakes. 
3.! Most accidents are avoidable. 
4.! Most accidents and injuries at work can be avoided. 
5.! Occupational accidents and injuries occur because employees do not take enough 
interest in safety. 
External safety locus of control 
6.! I think I am a victim of misfortune whenever I have an accident. 
7.! No matter how hard employees try to prevent them, there will always be on-the-job 
accidents. 
8.! For me avoiding accidents is a matter of luck. 
9.! There are so many dangers in this world that I never know how or when I might be in 
an accident. 
!
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10.!With my luck, I will probably have an accident in the near future. 
11.!The odds are in favor of me having an accident in the near future. 
12.!Industrial accidents are usually caused by unsafe equipment and poor safety regulations. 
13.!Most on-the-job accidents can be blamed on poor management. 
14.!It is the company's responsibility to prevent all accidents at work. 
Safety Knowledge (Griffin & Neal, 2000) 
1.! This employee knows how to perform the job in a safe manner. 
2.! This employee knows how to maintain or improve workplace health and safety. 
3.! This employee knows how to reduce the risk of accidents and incidents in the 
workplace. 
Safety Behavior (Griffin & Neal, 2000) 
Safety Compliance 
1.! This employee carries out work in a safe manner. 
2.! This employee uses all the necessary safety equipment to do the job. 
3.! This employee uses all the correct safety procedures for carrying out the job. 
4.! This employee ensures the highest levels of safety when I carry out the job. 
Safety Participation 
5.! This employee promotes the safety program within the organization. 
6.! This employee puts in extra effort to improve the safety of the workplace. 
7.! This employee helps others when we are working under risky or hazardous conditions. 
!
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8.! This employee voluntarily carries out tasks or activities that help to improve workplace 
safety. 
